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Abstract
The economic meltdown since 2008-9 has created disinflation, and even deflation in some
countries in the Euro-area, in a period with large debt overhang, creating the condition for
a continuing financial market stress in the Euro-area. As disinflation and deflation push up
the real interest rate, while growth and income declines, the leveraging problem becomes
more severe and the economy risks shifting into a regime with high insolvency risk, high
financial stress, rising credit spreads, possibly accompanied by strong adverse macroeconomic
feedback loops. Investigating the consequences of those magnifying feedback loops, given the
debt deflation, we demonstrate the possibility of unstable dynamics and downward spirals
in the presence of regime-dependent macro feedback loops, using a theoretical model with
decentralized matching mechanisms on both labor and financial markets. To explore the
amplifying linkages between deflation, output, labor and financial markets, we employ a new
solution procedure called NMPC to solve our models variants for out-of-steady-state dynamics.
We empirically explore deflationary trends in Europe and employ a Global VAR (GVAR)
model for a large euro area macro data set to estimate the impact of deflation on output.
Moreover, we use a four variable Multi-Regime VAR (MRVAR) model with regime dependent
IRs to study deflationary as well as well as the financial risk drivers in a MRVAR setting. New
measures for financial risk drivers are employed and multi-regime IRs for output, inflation
rates, interest rates and financial stress are explored. We also study regime changes in central
macro relationships such as regime change in the credit - output link, the Phillips curve and
in Okun’s law.
⇤Research on this paper was undertaken when Willi Semmler was Visiting Researcher at the European Central
Bank, Frankfurt, Winter 2014/15. He wants to thank the ECB for its hospitality. We want to thank Tony Bonen
for excellent research assistance. A previous version of the paper has been presented at an IMF seminar and the
conference on large-scale crises: 1929 vs 2008. We thank the participants for comments.
†Research Department, International Labor Organization, Geneva, Switzerland.
‡Dept. of Economics, New School for Social Research, New York, Bielefeld University, and ZEW Mannheim.
§Dept. of Economics, New School for Social Research, New York
1
1 Introduction
The financial and economic meltdown and the large drop in output and employment after 2007-8
has created disinflation – and in some countries even a deflation – in a period with large debt
overhang, invoking the Fisher debt deflation process of the 1930s. Yet, New Keynesian studies
have found that neither the US nor the Euro-area has shown a collapse of the inflation rate despite
the significant drop in output. Much research started to explain why the inflation rates moved
down so slowly and have not been falling as much as expected.1 The process of disinflation and
deflation in the Euro-area is slow.2 Yet, does the EU face a period of debt deflation and the risk
of a protracted recession? Moreover, will a regime of financial instability re-emerge, exacerbating
deflationary risks?
There are a few recent studies exploring such scenarios. The study by Werning (2011), adapting
a shorter horizon, deals with those issues in terms of a liquidity crisis. He employs a linear quadratic
macro model with central banks minimizing the loss from output and inflation gap, and shows for
the linearized macro model with an output equation and Phillips curve that as inflation turns into
dis-inflation, or deflation, the real interest rate tends to rise and the liquidity trap emerges, even
if the interest rate is already at the zero bound. This occurs with slowly moving prices, as in the
New Keynesian model, and becomes worse with fully flexible prices. Yet in this short-run model
there is neither an evolution of debt nor a regime change in the financial market that could amplify
the above process.
Another important recent study takes into account the evolution of debt and predicts a pro-
longed recession and a period of negative growth or slow growth in Europe, looking at debt build-up
and debt overhang (see Krugman and Eggertsson (2011)3). EK in their work refer back to the
Fisher debt-deflation study of the 1930s and more generally to the Fisher-Minksy-Koo approach.
In EK, a sudden deleveraging shock will lead to falling prices, thus increasing real debt which
in turn will decrease spending, thereby amplifying the adverse effects on prices – generating the
typical downward spiral of a debt deflation. Yet the overall deflationary process seems to be slow.
Regarding the evolution in the US and the Euro area one might not go so far as to invoke
spiraling deflationary pressures, as the above two studies do, but what one obviously can observe
is some debt overhang4 and a dis-inflationary process in most countries, with some Southern
European countries even sliding into a deflation. At the same time there is still severe, and
sporadically rising, financial market stress, in particular in some countries in Southern Europe.
The issue is then whether there will be a dis-inflationary process that triggers a debt deflation
spiral, and to what extent will it be magnified through a jump to high financial stress, high credit
spreads, as well as strong adverse macroeconomic feedback loops, which all could contribute to
generate a protracted period of recession.5
Another important issue is that the Euro-area is characterized by significant heterogeneity.
This suggests that US type monetary and fiscal policies will not capture sufficiently the diversity
in the Euro-area. A uniform monetary and financial market policy as well as growth and labor
market policies may be limited in their effects. For example QE for the entire Euro-area might
overlook the specific bottlenecks in credit flows, quantity constraints, and default risk areas.6
In the spirit of the above studies, and the need for permitting more heterogeneity in the EU, we
introduce a dynamic macro model which allows for decentralized matching mechanisms on labor
1See Christiano et al. (2014).
2In the Great Depression the output level dropped from 1929 to 1932 by roughly 32 % and the price level declined
in the same time period by 22%, see Marglin (2009), see also Fisher (1933). Though the drop in output in some
Southern Euro-area countries was also high, prices dropped much less in the Euro-area since 2007-8, see figure 1.
3Some authors have discussed this also under the topic of a secular stagnation.
4A recent report by McKinsey (2015) seems to offer fresh evidence of this. Beside private and sovereign debt
overhang, see Borio et al. (2015), there is also significant bank debt overhang, see Schleer et al. (2014)
5There is related literature that maintains that a prolonged recession could be a result of a deep financial shocks
with strongly affected banking system Borio et al. (2015) or as a result of a hysteresis effects after episodes of long
term underutiliztion of capacity and unemployment. For further causes of low growth and prolonged recessions, due
to slowing innovations, Gordon (2016), excess savings, Summers (2014) and multiple policy issues, Lo and Rogoff
(2015). Yet as mostly agreed the leading cause seems to be the debt overhang, see Lo and Rogoff (2015)), Jimeno
(2015).
6See Brunnermeier and Sannikov (2014b).
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and financial markets, allowing for a more extensive analysis of heterogeneities across EU countries.
Building on Ball and Mazumder (2014), and Gross and Semmler (2015), but similar to Werning
(2011), we introduce a Phillips curve driving the rate of change of the inflation rate. Moreover, as
in Krugman and Eggertsson (2011), we allow the build-up of debt to be impacted by the price level.
On the other hand, financial market stress can accelerate contractionary forces, and can prevent
recoveries from taking place, leading to a prolonged recession and unemployment. We show that
there may be both dis-inflationary – or deflationary – and credit market mechanisms working to
produce such effects. Those forces are possibly creating macroeconomic instabilities and regime
changes. Since the EK model assumes nominal debt contracts, deflation itself, the Fisher effect,
will be a contractionary force. On the other hand, if debt contracts are in real terms, or represent
inflation-adjusted one-period debt, the contractionary debt deflation effect might be reduced.7 Yet,
the financial market contraction may still be amplifying.
The forces resulting from a debt-overhang and disinflation/deflation are working through the
product and asset price dynamics and then through credit channels. In our model, there is lever-
aged investment and borrowing by households from the credit market, mediated through financial
intermediaries, as well as bond issuing. Contracting credit markets and higher credit spreads –
caused by previous excess leveraging and higher cost of borrowing – can create severe macro feed-
back effects and regime changes and financial market stress, so that households and firms also face
credit constraints and rising credit spreads, such that overall aggregate demand tends to fall.8
When aggregate demand falls, households, firms and banks can default, which in turn create
greater financial market stress, larger credit spreads, lower aggregate demand and so on. At the
same time, on the price side, one can observe some disinflation or worse, deflation, affecting the
above dynamics. Even though the nominal interest rate may be at a lower bound, if there is
disinflation the real interest rate rises. If aggregate monetary policy cannot manage to generate a
declining or negative real interest rate by increasing inflation, then a lower bound – possibly the
zero-lower bound – of the interest rate binds, output stays low and unemployment rises.
Debt deflation and financial market risk drivers accelerate downturns, possibly creating lock-
ins into a prolonged period of a recession. This is basically working as positive feedback loops
between the product market, price dynamics, credit and financial market and economic activity,9
where there might be excess savings, accompanied by a long lasting recession and unemployment,
or even a secular stagnation, as Summers (2014) and others have predicted. In this sense it is not
a deleveraging shock but rather a slow process of debt-disinflation or debt-deflation, accompanied
by rising financial market stress and credit spreads, that is causing the long-lasting recession. This
way monetary policy faces great challenges and might not be effective on the aggregate level.
Our matching mechanisms on the labor market follows Merz (1995) and Ernst and Semmler
(2010). The matching mechanism on the credit market is handled through financial intermediation
mechanisms, similar to Wasmer and Weil (2004) and Cui and Radde (2014). Both mechanisms
potentially allow for heterogeneity and can be employed to study the financial macro linkages in a
multi-period model. We do this without building on an infinite horizon model of the macroeconomy,
where agents usually have rational expectations and smooth consumption in the infinite horizon
context, and experience preference, technology and policy shocks, yet regime changes do not occur.
Usually in this context, models are linearized and only small deviations from the steady state are
allowed for, and large shocks are difficult to account for.10
In contrast, our approach permits to study the credit-macro feedback mechanisms in a multi-
period model without assuming an infinite time decision horizon. As to the solution method, our
model will not be solved locally through local linearization around the steady state, as used in
DYNARE, or globally by Dynamic Programming, as in Ernst and Semmler (2010), but by non-
linear model predictive control (NMPC), which has recently been developed by Gruene and Pannek
7This has been an argument against the Krugman and Eggertsson (2011) model.
8See Blanchard and Leigh (2013). Those positive feedback loops are already mentioned in Fisher (1933).
9This naturally shows up in some measures of capacity utilization. Many recent DSGE models have started
working with endogenous capital utilization and financial market, for example cost of capital when issuing bonds.
A relationship between capital utilization and the “user cost of capital” is also postulated by Keynes (1936).
10The models by Werning (2011) and also Krugman and Eggertsson (2011) are also infinite horizon models and
solved through local linearizations.
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(2011) and applied in Gruene et al. (2015). This numerical method allows for approximating the
accurate dynamics of the model by an N-period receding horizon model which will provide us
with an approximate solution for the decision and state variables. Though the NMPC numerical
method approximates the infinite time horizon model, with time periods N becoming very large,
the NMPC permits one to explore important issues, such as the rise of important constraints and
regime switching, in a model with a shorter time horizon.
In the empirical part we explore the impact of policy effects in typical regimes, such as booms
and recessions. We then take the model to the data and estimate and apply a multi-regime VAR
(MRVAR), as used Mittnik and Semmler (2013)), and Schleer and Semmler (2015), and Schleer
et al. (2014).11 But since we want to study also deflationary risk drivers, in addition to financial
risk drivers, our MRVAR employed here is higher dimensional and the MRVAR and the IRFs work
with four important macro variables such as output, inflation rate, credit spread and financial
stress.
The remainder of the paper is as follows. The next section presents some stylized facts concern-
ing debt-deflation dynamics and considers the differences between different world regions. Section
3 presents the theoretical model with decentralized labor and credit market matching mechanisms,
that introduces inflation and the dynamics of the price level and their impact on the capital stock,
leveraging, output gap and employment. Section 4 studies the financial risk drivers in a model
with endogenous regime change in the finance-macro link. In section 5 the higher dimensional
MRVAR methodology is applied to detect nonlinearities and regime changes in the link between
output, inflation rate, credit spread and financial stress. The IRFs for shocks on those variables
are explored in an econometric regime-change model. Some policy conclusions are drawn in section
6. A final section concludes. Technical details and some explorations of regime dependent macro
laws can be found in the appendix.
2 Stylized facts and GVAR results
Stylized facts of the Euro-area demonstrate the precarious deflationary trends in the EU as com-
pared to other regions of the world such as the US and Japan. This can be shown making use of a
large-scale Global Vector Autoregression model (GVAR) developed by Cesa-Bianchi et al. (2014)
and applied in Binder and Gross (2013).
Let us first establish to what extent there has been disinflation or even deflationary pressures
in the EU. Figure 1 demonstrates that deflation is particularly prevalent in the Southern countries
(Italy, Spain, Portugal and Greece). In contrast, Northern countries (Germany, France, Austria)
only show disinflation. Nevertheless, despite the sharp rise of unemployment among Southern
European countries, the drop in inflation remains relatively modest, an issue we will explore below.
11We can allow for regime switching, as can be found in recent DSGE models, see Schorfheide (2005) and Farmer
et al. (2009). There, however, it is assumed that the Euler equation, based on an infinite horizon solution, holds.
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Figure 1: Unemployment and inflation during the crisis: EU North vs. EU South
Using the GVAR methodology put forward by Binder and Gross (2013) allows to explore the
relative importance of the deflationary mechanism for the EU, Japan, US and United Kingdom.
GVAR allows for a large scale econometric approach to model the economic interdependence in
macro variables not only for time series data but also permits to model the interdependencies across
countries. Using trade-weights, the interlinkages between countries can be studied by combining a
set of country-specific VARs that contain weighted foreign variable vectors. This approach permits
to model simultaneously a large number of countries, and a broad set of economic time series
variables in one model. Usually, modelling an unrestricted conventional VAR is not feasible due
to the large number of parameters. The GVAR shows how one can set up and use multiple cross-
sections, while, at the same time, studying time series data of countries and regions. In our set-up,
we use the inflation rates, GDP growth, equity market performance, short and long term interest
rates, raw material and oil prices and exchange rates.12
The results of the GVAR study show that the EU has recently revealed stronger deflationary
trends than the US, UK, and Japan. In many EU countries there is not only disinflation, but there
is also deflation and a threat of a deflationary spiral. The impact on output, inflation rates and
interest rate is studied with the GVAR model using a large macro data set for the EU, US, UK,
and Japan.13
Figure 2: GVAR results - Deflation shock on GDP
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12Data on those variables can directly obtain within the GVAR program.
13For the data set, see Binder and Gross (2013).
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Figure 2 shows the response of GDP to a deflationary shock in the Euro area, UK, Japan, and
the US. It reveals that there is a much stronger deflationary pressure in the EU than in Japan,
US and United Kingdom. Though many economists thought that Japan went through a period of
deflationary pressure, it seems to look even more severe for the EU now.
3 Vulnerability through debt-deflation
The basic model that serves as a starting point for our theoretical considerations is described in
appendix 2. In this section, we want to start by introducing the inflation rate and price level effects
into our macro dynamics with leveraging. In the next section, we will introduce financial market
reactions, and macro feedback loops, resulting from higher leveraging of the agents in the economy.
As mentioned, after the Great Recession researchers where wondering why the inflation rate
did not quickly drop but moved down only very moderately. This is in contrast to the Great
Depression, where the price level dropped by roughly 25 percent.14 To understand the slowly
moving debt-deflation risk drivers, we introduce inflation and price level dynamics into our basic
model.
3.1 A model with debt dynamics and inflation
We follow the recent literature on slow inflation dynamics by letting the change of the inflation
rate be driven by a slightly modified new type of a Phillips curve, such as in Werning (2011) and
in Gross and Semmler (2015). We augment the basic model of appendix 2 with inflation and price
level dynamics and incorporate their impact on the evolution of debt. The augmented core model
then reads as follows:
max
Ct,It,Vt
ˆ N
0
U (Ct, Nt) e
 ⇢t =
ˆ N
0
(
C1 ⌘t
1  ⌘   eN
 
t
)
e ⇢t
s.t.
N˙t = m
L (st · Ut,Vt)   Nt (1)
K˙t = m
B (It/Pt,Bt/Pt)   Kt (2)
d˙t = rdt   1
Pt
( [PtYt (Kt, ANt)  PtCt   PtIt     (st) (1 Nt)  ⇣ · Vt    (gtKt)])  ⇡tdt (3)
Here, Ct represents aggregate consumption, Yt: aggregate production, A : (exogenous) labor
productivity, Ft: available financial funds through savings and external borrowing, Bt = Ft   Ct:
offered bonds to firms, r : the nominal interest rate, Nt: employment, Vt: vacancies and  (gtKt)
represent adjustment cost and bond issuing cost. In addition to costly search on the labor market,
issuing bonds adds another cost factor to the macroeconomic resource constraint, with per-period
flow costs  (gtKt), representing bond issuing and adjustment costs. The preferences are over
consumption flows, Ct, and employment, Nt.
The dynamics of eq. (1) represent the evolution of employment with the labour force normalized
to one. Eq. (2) denotes the evolution of the capital stock and eq. (3) represents the dynamics of
aggregate debt in real terms (for both households and firms).15 Our debt dynamics is written in
a standard way if one allows for borrowing of the private (or public), possibly also from abroad.16
Moreover, we have deflated the nominal variables – including the debt level – by the price level Pt,
and we have to add the term ⇡tdt with ⇡t the inflation rate.17
In eq. 3, the term [.] represents external borrowing (> 0) or repayment (< 0), in the former
case used for excess spending over domestic income. Moreover, we assume Ft = µCt, µ > 1 .
14For the price level fall, see Marglin (2009), and for the impact of price level fall and income fall on credit risk
and bank defaults, see Bernanke (1983), but also Fisher (1933).
15We could also allow for sovereign debt here, though we do not specify what fraction of debt is driven by
households, firms or the public sector.
16see Blanchard and Fisher (1989, ch.2) and Blanchard (1983).
17We hereby assume that the capital stock in (2) is already deflated.
6
Thus, consumption can be smoothed intertemporally, but investment funds might be restricted.
This means investment is more scrutinized through decentralized financial market matching mech-
anisms,18 but if there is a consumption boom, more investment funds will also be available on the
credit market.19
Moreover, search costs,   (s), are assumed to be fixed, with constant search effort s = 0.2. The
functionmL (s · Ut,Vt) in eq. (1) represents a decentralized matching function on the labor market.
Given the decentralized matching process mL (s · Ut,Vt) the job finding rate of the unemployed will
be mL(st·Ut,Vt)/Ut which – assuming constant search intensity – will depend on the vacancies posted
by firms and the unemployment rate.20 The job finding rate is thus the ratio of the numbers of
new hires divided by the number of workers searching for jobs. With higher unemployment and
lower vacancies the job finding rate is lower.21
On the credit market there is also a decentralized matching mechanisms, defined bymB (It,Bt),
which represents the decentralized matching mechanisms for the credit market. Both matching
functions for labor and credit markets display constant returns to scale and are represented by
a Cobb-Douglas functions with exponents q0=0.5 and q1 = 0.5. The parameters  ,   are the
separation rate and depreciation rate of capital, and   is our regime switching parameter which
will be either 1 or 0, depending on the degree of leverage permitted in the economy.
Partly because of recent empirical evidence and partly to avoid modelling the supply of funds,
we have made the supply of funds for firms’ investments a function of the supply of funds Ft Ct.
Given the external funding and the consumption decision, a fraction of funds can be used for
providing bond offering to be matched with the demand for bonds arising from firms’ desired
investment It. Funding for consumption will be available from domestic and external sources, but
investment funding will be obtained on the credit market by the decentralized matching process
on the credit market.
As in the basic model we assume that consumption is a direct decision variable and investment is
expressed as intended investment, I, to be matched with the supply of bonds, given by Ft Ct. This
assumption allows us to work with a lower dimensional system. It also could be interpreted that
the screening and monitoring of investment funding takes place more extensively than funding for
smoothing consumption. In the context here, consumption is only indirectly constrained, namely
through the state variables and the dominant component of demand as the IMF (2015) study seems
to suggest.
Finally, we have to formulate how we obtain the inflation rate and construct the price level Pt.
Similar to some New Keynesian literature we assume that inflation rate and the price level adjust
slowly.22 As in the NK view we can then proxy the inflation dynamics by the output gap and a
proxy for an expected inflation rate. Here, however, we are working with the rate of change of the
inflation rate.
⇡˙t =  (
Yt
Y ⇤
  1) + ⌘ct (4)
We let the change of the inflation rate respond to the output gap and some expectation term.
Using eq. (4) we rely on demand and cost pressure arguments but because of numerical reasons
we have chosen a short-cut of the Phillips curve. The inflation adjustment eq. (4)23 follows
18In principle, this allows us to study more properly the heterogeneity of the euro area credit market.
19This, for example, was likely to be the situation in Spain before the financial meltdown of the years 2007-9. Of
course, there are likely to be constraints for households’ borrowing as well, which will be discussed in section 4. For
a more general empirical result on the dominance of household behavior on borrowing and a sluggish response of
investment demand, see IMF (2015).
20This gives rise to the usual Beveridge curve.
21For details, including also time varying labor market participation rates, see Christiano et al. (2014).
22Usually the Calvo price setting procedure or the Mankiw quadratic adjustment cost of prices are employed to
get sticky prices. Our subsequent formulation is not inconsistent with views that presume that prices are driven
by marginal cost and expected inflation rates, see Keen and Wang (2007). There is then shown that through a
linearization the usual Phillips curve relationship is then proxied through a local output gap and expected inflation
rate.
23Flaschel et al. (2007) write the inflation rate being determined by ⇡ =  u(u⇤   u) +  Y ( YY ⇤   1) + ⇡c;
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in principle Rudebusch and Svensson (2002) as employed in Werning (2011).24 In RS, however,
inflation responds in a discrete time manner to time lags of the endogenous variables, to the output
gap and a moving average of inflation rate, with the latter term proxying expected inflation. In
our case, we have formulated a model corresponding to Rudebusch and Svensson, but written in
continuous time, using the rate of inflation as a differential equation. Note that starting with the
derivative of the inflation rate might make sense, since the inflation rate does not jump and in
many EU countries still tends to be slightly positive though the change of the inflation rate itself
was negative for a long time and now the inflation rate slowly turns to be negative too.
The inflation rate expression, ⌘ct, represents the inflationary climate – of the change in inflation
rates – in which the current inflation dynamics is operating. The climate variable ⌘ct, is thus a
magnitude that is related to the medium run and can be viewed to be updated in an adaptive
fashion, as explained in the footnote for eq. (4). Our inflation climate variable is constructed in
a similar way as in Ball and Mazumder (2014) who introduce some smooth process of inflation
expectations by anchoring the inflation expectations in survey data.
Note that our inflation dynamics could be interpreted as based on cost push pressures and
demand pressures,25 affected by the output gap and thus capacity utilization. Note also that in
eq. (4) we only use goods’ price inflation and thus assume that wage and price inflation do not
differ much when averaged over the medium-run. Wage cost pressure that firms are facing could
be formulated in a second term. For a detailed analysis of the stability properties of such price
and wage Phillips curves, see Flaschel et al. (2007). Empirical evidence on slowly moving inflation
rates, justifying to focus on the change of inflation rate, as in eq. (4) is given in Gross and Semmler
(2015) and in appendix 5, where a regime dependent Phillips curve is studied.
An important reason why there is disinflation rather than deflation – or the inflation does not
become strongly negative as much research recently has pointed out – is that during contractions,
such as the recent one, the demand pressure will reduce prices but the risk premia and credit
spreads increase credit costs, in particular for credit on working capital, pushing up costs.26 So
there is a cost push as well as a demand effect working, preventing the inflation rate from falling
less than one would expect.
Lastly we need to introduce the aggregate price level dynamics, since this is used in eqs. (2)-(3).
The price level dynamics can be defined through the following differential equation:
P˙t = ⇡t (5)
Note that eq. (5) can be used to determine a price index, starting with P0 = 1, that represents
the integrated inflation rates as a solution of eq. (5), so as to obtain Pt.
The following parameters for the NMPC solutions are used: µ = 1.3 and   = 035,  = 0.1,
⇢ = r = 0.03,   = 0.03,   = 0.04, ↵ = 0.36, A = 1, ⇠ = 0.07,   = 5, e = 1. The parameter   is set
to one, which means there are no credit constraints (if set to zero there are credit constraints). In
our numerical solution algorithm we start with a price level P0 = 1, integrate the inflation rates
following eq. (5) to obtain Pt and deflate appropriately the nominal variables such as the demand
for firms’ funds and the bond supply, It/Pt, Bt/Pt, in eq.(2). We also deflate debt service in eq.
with ⇡˙c =  ⇡c (⇡   ⇡c). In the first equation, the first term on the right hand side defines the unemployment
gap (representing pressure from the labor market) and the second the output gap (representing pressure from the
product market), see Flaschel et al. (2007)). The second equation, a differential equation, defines an expectational
term, the inflation climate, with a path toward a steady state inflation rate. The expectational term represents the
change of the climate inflation and can be interpreted as in Ball and Mazumder (2014) as an anchor of inflation
rates, as a consensus forecast of CPI inflation or as inflation climate, similar to Flaschel et al. (2007), see also Gross
and Semmler (2015) and their use of survey data. In our eq. 4 we have only used the first term of the inflation
dynamics ⇡t, and we have set ⌘ct =⇡˙c. In our subsequent numerical solutions we use eq. 4 for an inflation dynamics,
and thus employ only the output gap and let the dynamics of ⇡˙c, being generated by some moving average of the
change of inflation rates.
24Werning (2011), however assumes a form where the current change of the inflation rate is anchored in the purely
forward looking form of the agents’ behavior, and thus he has a negative sign for the output gap. Econometric
evidence for this formulation seems to be very weak as Gordon (2011) and Ball and Mazumder (2014) argue. This
criticism does not hold for Rudebusch and Svensson (2002). We follow more the latter approach.
25see also Christiano et al. (2014).
26For details, see Christiano et al. (2014)
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Figure 3: Solution path of capital and real debt to capital ratio; initial condition for N(0) = 0.9
and D(0)/K(0) = 1.8, lower trajectory: because of low and declining real interest rate, Kt moves
up and the leveraging ratio moves up a bit and then down; upper trajectory: because of deflation
and high real interest rates, and high debt, Kt first moves up, but then down, and debt and the
leverage ratio become unstable
(3), income, total financial funds, the search cost for jobs as well as the search cost for issuing
bonds. This way we obtain the evolution of the variables in real terms, and also debt in real terms,
as determined by the level of debt, the excess of income over spending and the interest rate and
inflation rate.
We solve this higher dimensional macro model (1) - (5), that makes the debt-deflation risk
drivers explicit, by using NMPC with the above defined objective function for a finite time horizon.
In our numerical solution we start now in the vicinity of the steady state of the basic model – but
in order to proxy a recession, we also start with a negative output and employment gap. We take
N(0) = 0.9 as the initial employment rate.27 We track the path of all state variables, including
the inflation and price dynamics as defined in eqs. (4) and (5).
In the numerical solution of the model (1)- (5) we can distinguish two cases (as depicted
figure 3). The upper trajectory represents one case, the lower trajectory another case. As our
price adjustment process suggests sticky prices, we have slow inflation rate movements. Moreover,
we assume that when the economy contracts we have different initial conditions for the price
adjustment process. How do those two cases emerge in figure 3? This will be discussed next.
3.2 Debt deflation and slow recovery
The lower trajectory of figure 3 presumes that we start with an economy that had not experienced
disinflation, the inflation rate is at target, roughly 2 percent, we thus commence with an initial
⇡(0) = 0.02. Yet, the fiscal or monetary policy may have initiated a slight recovery, and the output
gap starts closing again. Given a nominal interest rate of r = 0.03,28 we can observe that the
ratio of real debt to capital stock first rises but then declines after a while. The latter is due to
low interest rates, excess of income over spending, positive inflation rates, and a rising price level,
arising from eq. (4), and thus declining real interest rates. As we can observe from figure 4 and
27In our model, there is no labor force inactivity, so the employment rate is simply the inverse of the unemployment
rate.
28Note that in this section we keep the nominal interest rate on a fixed level, but of course the central bank may
reduce the interest rate to the lowest bound possible. On the other hand, market credit cost may still be higher due
to credit spreads. To capture this effect we keep a constant interest rate, this will be changed in sect. 4.
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5 the inflation rate goes up to almost ⇡t = 0.045 and the employment gap, figure 5, declines (and
the output gap declines as well, not shown here).29
Note that we have imposed an initial inflation rate of ⇡(0) = 0.02, which was roughly the
inflation target of the central banks, at the beginning of the Great Recession. We start with this
target, even if the economy moves into a recession with a negative output gap. Yet, prices are
sticky downwards. There is a positive inflation rate, but it is first slightly decreasing, see figure 4,
so the inflation rate first moves slightly down with excess capacity and a negative employment gap,
both representing downward demand pressures, but then rises again. This may in fact represent
some of the countries’ experience when there was no self-enforcing debt deflation or disinflation,
for example the US, and the UK, but also Germany, and France, where inflation rates have not
fallen much.
Figure 4: Inflation rate corresponding to lower trajectory of figure 3; starting with negative em-
ployment gap, first slightly declining inflation rate, then inflation rate rising with diminishing
employment gap, for initial ⇡(0) = 0.02
Figure 5: Employment gap corresponding to lower trajectory of figure 3; diminishing employment
gap over time, for initial values ⇡(0) = 0.02
29It is interesting to observe the employment gap and inflation rate. They are both driven by the output gap
which is endogenously given from the system (1)-(5) not depicted here. Figures 4 and 5 represent the inflation path
given by eq. (4) and the employment gap path respectively. As shown, the inflation rate is rather sticky and does
not turn negative even with a negative employment gap, see figure 4, but moves only down little when there is an
employment (output) gap. We thus can observe disinflation with such a gap, but not necessarily a deflationary
process.
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The main effect of the path toward sustainable debt comes from the growth or income term
in eq. (3). The credit cost is almost cancelled out by the inflation rate and if there is sufficient
income growth the term  [.] may have a positive sign, allowing the economy to grow out of debt.
So, output and income growth also allows the output gap to close, pushing up the inflation rate
(see figure 4 where the inflation rate is moving up to 4.5 %, reducing even more and more the real
cost of borrowing).30
3.3 Debt deflation and prolonged recession
Things change when initial inflation conditions are much lower. Let us consider the initial inflation
rate being much lower, triggered by a negative output gap. We assume that the central bank
cannot – or is not willing – to generate lower interest rates fast enough and cannot cause inflation
rates to move up. Since the inflation rate is sticky through eq. (4), even if there is a slight recovery,
the inflation rate is only rising slowly with declining output and employment gaps.
In figure 3, the upper trajectory shows the path of the real debt-to-capital ratio when we start
with an economy that had experienced disinflation and the actual inflation rate has become zero,
or negative. We start with an initial ⇡(0) = 0, but, because of high real real interest rates (nominal
interest rate is 0.03 and inflation rate zero), the slightly rising inflation rate reduces the nominal
interest rate only very little – and the high debt level moves up further. The last term in eq.
(3) is very small as compared to the first term, and if the middle term does not move much,
because output and income does not grow, debt will rise. 31 We can observe here that the debt
and leverage ratio eventually becomes unstable, though the capital stock, Kt first moves up, and
declines afterwards.32 The main effect on the rise of debt comes from both, the rise of the real
interest rate and the slow or negative income growth.33
Figure 6 is for the upper trajectory of figure 3, depicting the path of the inflation rate. Figure
7 shows the same closing of the employment gap, driven by the closing output gap. But note that
all of this still holds if we stay in a regime with little financial stress, with no rise in credit spreads,
but below the steady state variable of Nt < N⇤ and Yt < Y ⇤ (see figure 7 for the employment
gap). This may in fact represent some EU countries experience when there was self-enforcing debt
deflation or disinflation, for example Greece, Portugal, and Spain, and also Italy recently, where
inflation rates moved down to zero and even below zero, letting real interest rates rise. 34
Though in both cases, the upper and lower trajectory in figure 3, the economy may recover
but in the case of the lower trajectory, the economy recovers more quickly whereas for the upper
trajectory, with only slowly moving inflation, rising real interest rate and possibly rising debt
burden, there is further increase of debt overhang and the economy is possibly moving into a slow
moving debt crisis to be discussed further in sect. 4.
Note that in figures 4 to 7 the corresponding output and employment gaps, and thus the
inflation rate, are driven by the system (1)-(5). In our simulations a normal level of employment
is set at 95 % of the available labor force. We have normalized this to 1 in figures 5 and 7. The
employment level, given the large output gap we start with, is low and thus unemployment is high,
roughly about 10 percent, as one could observe after 2007-8 in most countries. But also note that
the employment gap is endogenously generated, and it is also a result of the vacancy rates chosen
by firms, given the dynamic model (1)-(5).
So far we have presumed no further financial market reactions and financial market stress,
and we have not taken into account a possible regime change on the financial market, with rising
default risk and credit spreads, and possibly adverse macro feedback loops. One is likely to expect
different outcomes with such a rising financial market stress. We will explore some important
30This is what Tobin (1987) had in mind when discussing debt sustainability. Note that this is also consistent
with the debt sustainability defined by Bohn (2007).
31This is an argument used in the study of sustainable debt already by Tobin (1987). This maybe amplified if
financial stress jumps up.
32If recently the inflation rate was falling further, it was presumably due to the decrease in the oil price.
33This again can be illustrated by using the Tobin debt sustainability model, see also Fisher (1933).
34But note if the bonds and thus the debt are partially indexed, one would get a weaker effect, as will be discussed
in section 4.
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Figure 6: Inflation rate corresponding to upper trajectory of figure 3, starting with a zero initial
inflation rate, triggered by a negative output gap; inflation rate is only slowly rising with declining
output and employment gaps, initial inflation rate ⇡(0) = 0.0
Figure 7: Employment gap corresponding to upper trajectory of figure 3; first faster then slowly
declining employment gap
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empirical features next and other aspects in appendix 5.
4 Financial market instability and regime change
We want to allow now for a rise of financial market stress, possibly due to rise of unsustainable
real debt (of households, firms banks, sovereign), resulting in higher default risk, risk premia and
credit spread and thus in a contraction of credit flows.
We will thus introduce an endogenous rise of risk premia and credit spreads to become strong
factors in the macro dynamics which also trigger credit cost to go beyond the deflation risk drivers
discussed in the previous section. To study this issue we can set the price index P = 1 and
thus ⇡ = 0, for all t. Since we want to consider other major contractionary financial forces now,
the Fisher debt-deflation effect is neglected in the next step. This also could be seen as roughly
equivalent to fully indexed bonds and thus debt.35
We again refer back to the basic model of appendix 2, but now we will introduce endogenous
credit cost and and credit spreads. We explore two model variants. In one version there are
only very weak macro feedback effects to aggregate demand when credit spread is rising. In the
other version we will include stronger macro feedback effects. This modeling strategy is important
because it brings out the role of leveraging, debt overhang, financial instability and credit cost
jumps which are not present in the liquidity model such as Werning (2011).
4.1 Endogenous credit spreads and weak macro feedbacks
Our model with endogenous risk premia and credit spreads36 can be written as follows.
max
Ct,It,Vt
ˆ N
0
e rtU(Ct, Nt)dt (6)
s.t.
N˙t = m
L(sUt,Vt)   Nt (7)
K˙t = m
B (It,Bt)   Kt (8)
D˙t = r(fst| , )Dt    [Y t   Ct   It     (st) (1 Nt)  ⇣ · Vt   '(gtKt)] (9)
In eq. (6) there are again preferences over log utility and non-working time. The policy variables
are consumption, growth rate of capital stock, and vacancies posted by firms, Ct, gt,Vt. 37 As
before, eq. (7) represents the decentralized matching mechanism on the labor market and credit
market and we continue to assume the search effort s to be constant. The capital stock increases
due to investment financed via the decentralized search and matching on the credit market (see
eq. (8)) and declines with capital depreciation at rate  . The interest payment on debt, r(·)Dt,
now increases with debt but the surplus  [Y t   Ct   It   gtKt....] – negative excess absorption –
decreases debt. Hereby again we have set It = gtKt. The interest rate is now driven by financial
stress, fst, as discussed above.
The expression in brackets  [·] can be interpreted again as change in external liabilities. As
before, since consumption and investment are separate policy variables we allow for external bor-
rowing. As before, '(gtkt) is a quadratic adjustment cost for investment, included in eq. (9).
Overall the model has now three decision variables and three state variables.38
35This might avoid the criticism of the EK model of assuming not having indexed bonds.
36Blanchard (2013) expresses this as a jump to a second, bad, equilibrium: “The higher the debt, the higher the
probability of default, the higher the spread on government bonds, and the harder it is for the government to achieve
debt sustainability. But the adverse effects do not stop there... “.
37Actually in the numerics we can take ct = Ct/kt, so that the first two choice variables can be confined to
reasonable constraints between 0 and 1.
38Note that we assume here a difference of interest and discount rates. Krugman and Eggertsson (2011), and
also Brunnermeier and Sannikov (2014a), give a justification of why the interest rate might be different from the
discount rate.
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Arellano (2008) argues that, with a probability of default, the market price to be paid for the
next period’s bond is affected. If the bond actually defaults the value of the bond is zero and there
is a welfare loss for the bond issuer.39 If the bond issuer is not defaulting the bond continues to
be in use and the bond price (inversely the yield) will fall due to the level of debt and rise due to
a positive shock on income. Now one can think of those two extreme scenarios as off-on cases.40 If
we want to smooth out the off-on cases, as the only two scenarios, we can perceive a continuum of
cases where the probability of default may steadily rise starting from a low level, and then leveling
off, where no bonds can be be issued any more. One can make the bond prices and thus the yields,
a nonlinear function of financial stress arising from leveraging and default risk.41
Iin contrast to the model variant of section 3, therefore, here we assume that the actual interest
payments are a nonlinear function of some measure of leveraging. Hence, we represent r(fst| , c))
by a logistic function of the following type42
r(fst| , c) = [1 + exp(  (fst   c))] 1,   > 0 (10)
with the credit spread and interest r(·) arising from financial stress, fst, in particular if it is rising
above some threshold, c. For the construction of such a financial stress index, see Schleer and
Semmler (2015).
This function represents roughly the function that has been observed by De Grauwe (2012)
in EU data43 and can be thought of as representing the shape of financial stress that has been
observed in Schleer and Semmler (2015). The interest payment rises with the shape of the function
of eq. (10), first slowly, then more rapidly but it is then finally bounded.
One would expect that with less financial stress and lower interest payments on debt a higher
steady state leveraging ratio is admissible. Again, debt is sustainable if the second term in eq. (9),
the excess of income over spending, is equal to the first term, the interest payments on debt.44
The result of our finite horizon model as presented in eqs. (6)-(10), using our NMPC methodol-
ogy, is shown in figure 8. Note that in the simulations the upper part of the trajectory is unstable
and the debt to capital ratio eventually becomes unbounded.
To obtain figure 8, we have set the macro feedback effects to be weak.45 As to the solution
path for the capital stock and leveraging, figure 8 shows that lower interest payment on bonds
39See also Roch and Uhlig (2012). They include a utility loss in the welfare function which is similar to the
Blanchard (1983) model and in Mittnik and Semmler (2013).
40Blanchard (2013) expresses this as multiple equilibrium dynamics: “The higher the debt, the higher the proba-
bility of default, the higher the spread on government bonds, and the harder it is for the government to achieve debt
sustainability. But the adverse effects do not stop there. Higher sovereign spreads affect private lending spreads, and
in turn affect investment and consumption. Higher uncertainty about debt sustainability, and accordingly about
future inflation and future taxation, affects all decisions. I am struck at how limited our understanding is of these
channels. Reduced form regressions of growth on debt can take us only so far. ....At high levels of debt, there may
well be two equilibria, a “good equilibrium” at which rates are low and debt is sustainable, and a “bad equilibrium”
in which rates are high, and, as a result, the interest burden is higher, and, in turn, the probability of default is
higher. When debt is very high, it may not take much of a change of heart by investors to move from the good to
the bad equilibrium.” Blanchard (2013, 3).
41As empirics have shown, financial stress is related to high leveraging, but expresses many more factors than
leveraging, see Schleer and Semmler (2015). Principle Component Analysis shows that leveraging and credit spreads
are strong components. Others, for example, Gilchrist et al. (2009), have added a persistent shock to the leverage
ratio to obtain a higher credit spread.
42The following function has a similar shape as the exponential function as used in (10), see Schleer and Semmler
(2015). One can approximate the above function by an arctan function which has the same shape,
r(fst| , c) =   · arctan(Dt/Kt).
This function is often numerically more convenient.
43Representing EU sovereign debt and bond yield data. However a similar behavior has also been observed for
bond yields in the private sector, see Blanchard (2013). Others have formulated this as high and low probability of
default.
44Again, sustainability is used here in the sense that the debt to capital stock ratio converges to a constant.
45Note that the credit spread is nevertheless rising due to financial market stress. Others, seeWerning (2011) and
also Gavin et al. (2013) have allowed the interest rate to rise solely as a result of the central bank’s monetary policy
rule. They do not have credit spreads in their model. In our case the central bank can change the policy rate, but
what appears to be more important is the financial market stress and credit spread. Also, they do not consider the
impact of credit spread on debt sustainability.
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Figure 8: Dynamics with credit spread, without macro feedback loops
first admits a higher capital stock and higher leveraging. Yet, as the interest rates reach a certain
threshold, we observe that with an increasing leveraging, credit risk and risk premia, capital stock
stops rising but the leverage ratio is rising further. This is occurring when the credit spread is
moving beyond a certain threshold. Here then finally there is unsustainable debt since the interest
payment becomes higher than the surplus to service the debt, as the eq. (9) indicates. 46 The
contraction in output, investment and capital stock, and the rise of debt, as they are occurring
at the turning point in figure 8, may also be impacted by macroeconomic feedback as they are
discussed next.
4.2 Endogenous credit spreads and strong macro feedbacks
If feedback effects of leveraging and credit spread on investment and consumption decisions are
introduced alongside endogenous risk premia and credit spreads, a slow moving debt crisis might
emerge.47 Such macro feedback effects can also be interpreted as rise of macro uncertainty and
its effect on investment and consumption as in Cesa-Bianchi et al. (2014). To introduce these
modifications, we write our model now as:
max
Ct,It,Vt
ˆ N
0
e rtU(Ct, Nt)dt (11)
s.t.
N˙t = m
L(stUt,Vt)   Nt (12)
K˙t = m
B (It,Bt)   Kt (13)
D˙t = r(fst| , c))Dt    [Y at   Cat   Iat     (st) (1 Nt)  ⇣ · Vt   '(gtKt)] (14)
The difference to the model variant of sect. 4.1 above is now that besides the credit spread
being a nonlinear function of the debt to capital stock ratio, there is also an endogenous effect of
the credit spread on demand, output and income.48 There are indeed important macroeconomic
feedback mechanisms that one often can observe for an economy under financial stress, for the US
46This maybe be magnified by the reversion of the effect as mentioned before: namely the risk and risk premia
rising, discount rates rising and falling (or negative) capital gains, not supporting the debt repayments any more.
So debt would rise faster.
47Blanchard (2013) supports such a statement by referring to adverse macroeconomic feedback effects, see footnote
39.
48As aforementioned, Blanchard explicitly refers to those macro feedback mechanisms that not only affect the
sovereign debt sustainability but also aggregate demand and output, Blanchard (2013: 3).
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for example, see also Hall (2011) with respect to aggregate demand, Christiano et al. (2014) with
respect to a large number of macro variables, and Blanchard (2013) with respect to sovereign debt
risk and its spillover to private borrowing cost.
To specify the macro feedback loops, we can make the actual consumption and investment
demand depending on credit spread triggered by rising risk premia and bond yields. This would
be given by:
Cat = f(r(fst| , c))Copt (15)
Iat = g(r(fst| , c))Iopt (16)
Though optimal consumption and investment plans are chosen over the planning horizon N ,
actual consumption and investment declines due to rising financial stress risk premia and credit
spreads49 So, overall we may have:
Y at = u(r(fst| , c)Y optt (17)
We can take
u(r(fst| , c)) = (1  r(fst| , c)) (18)
and use the rising credit spread as self-enforcing mechanism reducing demand and output. Thus,
if risk premia and credit spreads rise, and there are macroeconomic feedback loops to aggregate
demand, this will reduce consumption, investment and actual output, Y a, accompanied by a lower
utilization of capacity. Thus tax revenue, as well as the net income, to service the debt, may fall.
This might make then credit issuing and debt unsustainable – generating a further jump in credit
spread.50
These economic outcomes seem to be less due to shocks but rather due to macroeconomic
feedback loops and their adverse economic impact 51 which may arise because of the following:
• If the financial market goes into distress and asset prices fall, there is the wealth effect
reducing aggregate demand and both consumption and investment demand are likely to fall
• The share of households that are income and credit constrained, in the sense of Gali et al.
(2004), and households that are higher leveraged and are under financial stress52 are signif-
icantly rising in a contraction period of the business cycle, see also Mittnik and Semmler
(2012b)
• As the financial market forces trigger financial stress,53 the central bank may have no instru-
ments available – or is not willing – to force the interest rate down further and/or to reduce
risk premia and credit spreads, for example by purchasing sovereign bonds to drive down
sovereign risk and risky bond yields54
• Given the labor market constraints, a fraction of private households could start deleveraging
strongly, which reduces income and liquidity of other households and firms and might be
accompanied by a debt-deflation spiral that Krugman and Eggertsson (2011) describe 55
49In the local linearization version of the New Keynesian, this would just show up in the rise of the interest rate
in the output equation, see Werning (2011).
50Yet one might also face insolvencies of households, firms or financial intermediaries, in the period of high financial
stress, which would amplify the above described contraction.
51A systematic study of macroeconomic feedback effect, know from the history of macroeconomics, partly stabi-
lizing partly destabilizing, are extensively discussed in Charpe et al. (2015)
52The share of those households matter, since there is empirical evidence that the drop in demand will be larger
for households with larger debt and that are forced to deleverage more, see Krugman and Eggertsson (2011)).
53see Schleer and Semmler (2015) for a banking oriented stress index.
54The ECB was initially constrained by the Maastricht Treaty not to purchase sovereign bonds. Later this was
relaxed by allowing it to purchase sovereign bonds on the secondary market, though there were number of programs
that by-passed the Maastricht Treaty, as the recent ECB QE program with extensive bond purchases that has
brought down significantly the credit spread, see sect. 4.3.
55A detailed discussion of further macroeconomic feedback effects of this type can be found in Charpe et al. (2015).
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Figure 9: Debt dynamics with endogenous credit spreads and weak macro feedback loops (right
trajectory), and debt dynamics with endogenous credit spreads and strong macro feedback loops
(left trajectory), both starting from the initial condition K(0) = 5.8, D(0) = 1.2., both trajectories
indicating instability.
• Finally, there could occur an even worse feedback: a weak financial sector, holding risky
sovereign debt, may come under severe stress, because sovereign bonds may go into default
and banks reduce lending to the real economy, or worse, may even default56
Whereas the first four destabilizing mechanisms have been known in the literature and are often
viewed to generate a vicious cycle, the last one, which has recently been discussed, adds a more
dangerous mechanism which has been called “diabolic loop”.57
With these stronger macroeconomic feedback loops, we can expect, starting with a certain debt
to capital stock ratio that the above feedback mechanisms lead to negative wealth effects, higher
financial market stress and higher default premia, higher credit spreads and lower output leading
in turn to a contraction in the utilization of the capital stock, and capital stock itself, and to
an increasing leveraging ratio.58 Note that a situation is sketched here where the central bank
is apparently unable or incapable to bring down sufficiently the risk premia, credit spreads and
financial stress, through asset market interventions.
Figure 9 shows two solution paths for our system (11)-(18) using our NMPC procedure: the
right trajectory is without (or very weak) macro feedback effects on consumption and investment
demand, and the left trajectory is the solution path under the impact of strong macroeconomic
feedback loops. For comparison we have included in figure 9 the solution as shown in the figure for
the weak macro effects. As one can observe from the left trajectory there is now a much stronger
contractionary effect as compared to the dynamics shown in the right trajectory. Yet, both solution
path of both trajectories indicate that macro variables diverge and debt will not be stabilized, and
a slow moving or acute debt crisis may occur.
5 Multi-Regime VAR estimations
Our main drivers of the debt deflation - financial stress dynamics in the above approach are output,
inflation rate, credit cost and financial stress. Our model variants suggests different financial market
regimes with vastly different outcomes for growth and employment. The first model variant as
presented in appendix 2 predicts a tranquil financial regime with little effects from shocks. In
56See Brunnermeier and Oehmke (2013).
57See Brunnermeier and Oehmke (2013)).
58This could equivalently create a downward spiral in net worth, if the model is written in terms of net worth, as
in Brunnermeier and Sannikov (2014a) and Stein (2012).
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contrast, the variant introduced in sect. 4.2. can be considered a financial stress regime with
strong effects from shocks.
In order to estimate the relevance of these two regimes, we estimate a multi-regime vector
autoregression (MRVAR). Long time series data to estimate such a higher dimensional MRVAR
are not easy to obtain, so we used some proxies, particularly for credit costs. We utilize different
sources for our dataset: for France and Germany we employ monthly data which runs from January
2003 until January 2013, where we use the index of industrial production for output and the HICP
for the inflation rate. Both variables are taken from Eurostat and we use first differences for both.
Credit cost is represented by the long-term cost of borrowing from the MFI interest rate statistics
by the ECB59.
For Spain and Italy, data limitations force us to use different data sources: changes in GDP
and the inflation rate are taken from the GVAR project Smith and Galesi (2014). Their data is
taken from the International Financial Statistics (IFS), where GDP is a real index with base year
2005 and inflation rates represent changes in consumer prices. The data runs from 1980 until 2013
on a quarterly basis. State dependent credit cost would ideally be represented by private lending
cost. However, for the period until 2003 data on private lending cost was not available. Therefore
we detrended the long-term interest rate provided by Smith and Galesi (2014) (Interest Rates,
Government Securities, Government Bonds concept) for the period until 2003. From 2003 until
2013 we use the MFI interest rate statistics, as described above for Germany and France, by the
ECB again. Here we compute quarterly averages of the monthly interest rates provided by the
ECB.
Finally, our regime defining variable is financial stress. For this we take the ZEW financial
conditions index (FCI), which acts as the endogenous threshold variable in our MRVAR model and
taken from Schleer and Semmler (2015). Again we use monthly data for Germany and France,
while for Italy and Spain we will build quarterly averages. All empirical measures are discussed in
more detail in appendix 5.
5.1 Methodolgy
For our estimation we rely on a MRVAR with the FCI as an endogenous threshold variable, which
allows for regime or state dependent effects of increasing financial stress.
We are using a nonlinear approach due to the shortcomings of linear VARs. In a linear model,
with orthogonal impulse responses, state dependent effects of shocks are not taken into account,
while impulse responses are symmetric with respect to the sign of the shock and linear in terms of
their size (Koop et al. (1996)). Thus, given our model in section 4, it would be inappropriate to use
a linear approach. Instead we use a multi-regime model which allows us to study regime-dependent
effects. The MRVAR can be defined the following way:
yt = ci +
pX
j=1
Aijyt j + ✏it if ⌧i 1 < rt d  ⌧i (19)
where yt = (y1t, . . . , ynt) represents the endogenous variables and ci is a vector of regime-
dependent constants. ⌧ stands for the threshold values and rt d is the endogenous threshold
variable, while d is the threshold delay.
Ultimately, like in the case of a linear VAR, we are interested in the effects of a shock to a
specific endogenous variable on the equation system depicted above. However, orthogonal impulse
responses are not appropriate here due to the shortcomings described above. Instead one has to use
generalized impulse response functions (GIRF) (see Koop et al. (1996)). GIRF allows us to take
asymmetries with respect to the sign of the shock, the size of the shock and its history-dependence
into account.
The GIRF work the following way:60 we split our data set into subsets of observations according
to the regimes they belong to and analyze each regime on its own by taking a random starting
59https://sdw.ecb.europa.eu/browse.do?node=2018774
60A detailed algorithm for computing the generalized impulse responses is described in appendix 3
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90% 95% 97.5% 99% Test Statistic P-Value
Crit. Value MRVAR 41.80704 45.72410 50.16905 53.54682 78.80691 0.0000
Table 1: Spain: Test of linear VAR against MRVAR
90% 95% 97.5% 99% Test Statistic P-Value
Crit. Value MRVAR 42.55922 48.53784 52.41626 57.08231 33.14374 0.37900
Table 2: Italy: Test of linear VAR against MRVAR
90% 95% 97.5% 99% Test Statistic P-Value
Crit. Value MRVAR 41.45162 45.98056 51.41440 57.78622 95.08549 0.0000
Table 3: Germany: Test of linear VAR against MRVAR
90% 95% 97.5% 99% Test Statistic P-Value
Crit. Value MRVAR 41.50703 46.01810 49.65223 56.64130 65.00116 0.00300
Table 4: France: Test of linear VAR against MRVAR
value from a given regime and simulating the model with bootstrapped (regime-specific) residuals.
We repeat the simulation with the same starting values and bootstrapped residuals, but we add an
additional shock to one variable in period one. This procedure is then undertaken 100  times for
a given starting value and randomly drawn residuals and afterwards the average of the simulations
is computed. We repeat the simulation 300   times for each regime where histories are drawn
randomly for each of them.
5.2 Empirical Analysis
Before estimating a MRVAR we have to test for the significance of threshold effects, where we
use the test developed by Lo and Zivot (2001) to test the null hypothesis of linearity against the
alternative of threshold effects. This test can be seen as a necessary condition for the appropri-
ateness of our theoretical and empirical models. If the test fails to reject the null hypothesis of
linearity, state dependencies of our economies with respect to financial market conditions would
not be observed and a linear VAR would be adequate.
The threshold test was conducted with 1000 bootstrap replications for each country and a
trimming value of 0.1 which guarantees that each regime contains at least 10% of all observations.
The results are shown in tables (1) through (4).
As can be seen from tables (1) through (4), the tests reject the null hypothesis of linearity for
all countries, but Italy. However, for reasons of comparison, we still decided to estimate a MRVAR
model for Italy.
As the test for threshold effects suggested, estimating a model with two regimes, we conducted
our analysis with the same settings as our threshold tests with the exception of the trimming value,
which was set to 0.3. The threshold value and threshold delay were identified by a grid search with
the objective of minimizing the sum of squared residuals, where the threshold delay was set to one
for all countries. The lag lengths of of our models were informed by the Schwartz criteria, which
suggested a lag length of one for all countries.61.
In the next step we employed GIRF to simulate the effects of a shock to the FCI index on the
change in output.The impulse responses are depicted in figures (10(a)) through (11(b)).
61The estimation results are listed in appendix 7
19
0
5
1
0
1
5
2
0
2
5
3
0
-0.0025-0.0020-0.0015-0.0010-0.00050.0000
R
e
s
p
o
n
s
e
 
o
f
 
d
y
 
t
o
 
s
h
o
c
k
 
o
f
 
f
c
i
h
o
r
iz
o
n
response
R
e
g
im
e
:
 
B
d
o
w
n
0
5
1
0
1
5
2
0
2
5
3
0
-0.0025-0.0020-0.0015-0.0010-0.00050.0000
R
e
s
p
o
n
s
e
 
o
f
 
d
y
 
t
o
 
s
h
o
c
k
 
o
f
 
f
c
i
h
o
r
iz
o
n
response
R
e
g
im
e
:
 
B
u
p
(a
)
Sp
ai
n:
lo
w
st
re
ss
(R
eg
im
e:
B
do
w
n)
an
d
hi
gh
st
re
ss
(R
eg
im
e:
B
up
)
0
5
1
0
1
5
2
0
2
5
3
0
-0.006-0.005-0.004-0.003-0.002-0.0010.000
R
e
s
p
o
n
s
e
 
o
f
 
d
y
 
t
o
 
s
h
o
c
k
 
o
f
 
f
c
i
h
o
r
iz
o
n
response
R
e
g
im
e
:
 
B
d
o
w
n
0
5
1
0
1
5
2
0
2
5
3
0
-0.006-0.005-0.004-0.003-0.002-0.0010.000
R
e
s
p
o
n
s
e
 
o
f
 
d
y
 
t
o
 
s
h
o
c
k
 
o
f
 
f
c
i
h
o
r
iz
o
n
response
R
e
g
im
e
:
 
B
u
p
(b
)
It
al
y:
lo
w
st
re
ss
(R
eg
im
e:
B
do
w
n)
an
d
hi
gh
st
re
ss
(R
eg
im
e:
B
up
)
Fi
gu
re
10
:
R
es
po
ns
e
of
ch
an
ge
in
ou
tp
ut
to
a
FC
I
sh
oc
k
of
1
s.
d.
0
5
1
0
1
5
2
0
2
5
3
0
-0.6-0.4-0.20.00.2
R
e
s
p
o
n
s
e
 
o
f
 
i
i
p
 
t
o
 
s
h
o
c
k
 
o
f
 
f
c
i
h
o
r
iz
o
n
response
R
e
g
im
e
:
 
B
d
o
w
n
0
5
1
0
1
5
2
0
2
5
3
0
-0.6-0.4-0.20.00.2
R
e
s
p
o
n
s
e
 
o
f
 
i
i
p
 
t
o
 
s
h
o
c
k
 
o
f
 
f
c
i
h
o
r
iz
o
n
response
R
e
g
im
e
:
 
B
u
p
(a
)
G
er
m
an
y:
lo
w
st
re
ss
(R
eg
im
e:
B
do
w
n)
an
d
hi
gh
st
re
ss
(R
eg
im
e:
B
up
)
0
5
1
0
1
5
2
0
2
5
3
0
-0.4-0.3-0.2-0.10.0
R
e
s
p
o
n
s
e
 
o
f
 
i
i
p
 
t
o
 
s
h
o
c
k
 
o
f
 
f
c
i
h
o
r
iz
o
n
response
R
e
g
im
e
:
 
B
d
o
w
n
0
5
1
0
1
5
2
0
2
5
3
0
-0.4-0.3-0.2-0.10.0
R
e
s
p
o
n
s
e
 
o
f
 
i
i
p
 
t
o
 
s
h
o
c
k
 
o
f
 
f
c
i
h
o
r
iz
o
n
response
R
e
g
im
e
:
 
B
u
p
(b
)
Fr
an
ce
:
lo
w
st
re
ss
(R
eg
im
e:
B
do
w
n)
an
d
hi
gh
st
re
ss
(R
eg
im
e:
B
up
)
Fi
gu
re
11
:
R
es
po
ns
e
of
ch
an
ge
in
ou
tp
ut
to
a
FC
I
sh
oc
k
of
1
s.
d.
20
The sub-figures on the left side of figures 10(a) and 10(b) show the response of changes in
output to a shock to the FCI (i.e. an increase in financial stress) for Italy and Spain during a time
of tranquil financial markets. It can be seen that change in output is negative, but decreases over
time and almost fades out. Thus the economies tend to recover over a period of 30 quarters.
On the other hand, an increase in financial stress during a period of tranquillity in Germany
and France does not have a big impact on change in output as can be seen from figures 11(a) and
11(b). Once again, the low stress regime is depicted on the left of the two sub-figures. The effect
turns negative after a short period, but remains very small.
The sub-figures on the right side of figures 10(b) through 11(b), however, show the effect of a
shock to the FCI on the change of output during a time of high financial stress. It can be seen,
reflecting the non-linearities of financial market shocks, that the consequences of increasing financial
stress are more severe in times of financial market stress, compared with a period of tranquility
in financial markets. The effect shows similar patterns for Spain, Germany, and France: While a
shock to the FCI during a period of high financial stress leads to a big contraction in output in
the beginning, the change in output becomes smaller as time progresses. The effect looks different
for Italy: Here a shock to the FCI leads to a negative initial response of change in output, which
remains negative, and becomes even stronger, as time passes on.
Thus the results of the impulse response analyses confirm our model predictions from section 4:
the qualitative behaviour of changes in output due to a financial market shock is different during
a time of financial stress, compared to a time of financial tranquillity. The negative response of
change in output becomes much stronger in times of high financial stress, thereby increasing the
strain on the economy even further.
6 Implications for macro policies
As we showed empirically in sect. 2 by using the GVAR approach, Europe currently faces the
danger of adverse effects of debt deflation on output and employment more strongly than Japan
and the US. Our study also demonstrated, though the disinflation or deflation of product prices
is likely to trigger a period of recession and output decline, there are, as the model variants of
sects. 4.1 and 4.2 demonstrated, additional financial risk drivers and a possible change into a high
financial stress regime, with high credit costs and low credit flows, that create the danger of a
protracted period of output and employment decline. This switch into a new regime is likely to be
triggered and amplified by overleveraging and actual defaults, insolvencies of firms and banks, loan
losses and fire sales of assets, leading to rapid credit, output and employment contractions. 62 We
have also shown that debt stabilization might become more difficult if there are both deflationary
and financial risk drivers.
As to the debt deflation spiral itself, disinflation and deflation has been built into the model
variant of sect. 3, replicating roughly the empirical results of the NK literature, though in a more
short cut way, in a higher dimensional macro model by using the rate of change of the inflation rate.
For some countries we could replicate the fact that in the Great Recession and its aftermath prices
did decline less than what had been expected given the large output and employment slacks. Our
empirics of sect. 5, estimating non-linearities and asymmetries of effects of shocks in a MRVAR
has also underlined the perils of debt deflation when it is coupled with an addition financial
market stress in a regime of credit spread rising and reduced credit flows, entailing an output and
employment decline.
When using our four dimensional MRVAR model with the financial stress as transition variable
we showed empirically that there is a high risk that the vulnerability of the financial sector and
financial stress may trigger a regime change in the financial market - output link. Though short
term interest rates can be kept down, following the Taylor rule for the central bank, real interest
rate might rise due to deflation and financial stress and credit spreads could nevertheless move
up, triggering a transition to a financial crisis regime in Euro-area countries.63 What appears to
62see Borio et al. (2015))
63Many earlier NK studies often allow the interest rate to to fall through the central bank’s monetary policy rule.
A new type of NK literature seems to emerge that take into account the role of financial market risk for risk premia
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be important in this context is the degree of the financial sector’s leveraging and overleveraging
(see appendix 3). In fact the latter issue, as our sect. 4 shows, the rise of vulnerability of the
financial sector, the decline of credit flows, and an increase of financial market stress, are important
amplifying forces that also trigger adverse macro feedback loops. This then appears to become a
more severe risk driver interacting with the slowly moving debt deflation process.
In this context we can spell out some implications of our modeling results for macro policies.
Pursuing sovereign debt consolidation policies might work under the conditions corresponding to
a normal path of the economy, such as sketched in appendix 2, and it also might temporally work
under the condition shown in the right trajectory in figure 9. Yet, in a regime of high financial
market stress, deflation and rising real interest rate, and a larger jump in the risk premia, with
capital gains and net worth falling, the banking system under financial stress, and with central
banks constrained to undertake an unconventional intervention into asset markets, the strong
macro feedback loops create great challenges for fiscal consolidation policies, and they are likely
not to be successful, under the condition of the left trajectory of figure 9. In this case, output and
employment multipliers are strong and are likely to trigger adverse and amplifying feedback loops.
Moreover, as appendix 2 might demonstrated, a declining credit risk and credit spreads, possibly
engineered by monetary policy through quantitative easing, can reduce adverse macro feedback
effects and support policies of debt sustainability output and employment growth. As recent
empirical literature on EU periphery countries have shown, reducing the risk premia and credit
spread appears to be an important escape route from high financial stress and default risk and
re-initiating credit flows. Thus, monetary policy of quantitative easing, which was pursued in the
US in the aftermath of the Great Recession, and introduced in Euro area countries with the ECB
policy starting in January 2015, seems to be very important to escape from a deflationary trends
and high financial stress-high credit spread regimes.
However, what might be needed is – as Brunnermeier and Sannikov (2014b) argue – a more
selective monetary policy, as well as selective asset market and credit market policies to overcome
regional and local bottle necks in lending and borrowing. We have shown that output and employ-
ment gaps, arising for example in financially caused recessionary periods, give rise, together with
low vacancy rates, to low job finding rates and high unemployment. The decentralized matching
mechanisms of the labor and credit markets in the Euro-Area economies may result in quite dif-
ferent success rates of aggregate policies. More specific growth and labor market policies may be
appropriate. This seems to be in contrast to the observations of the policy effects in the long lasting
period of output and employment decline in the US after the Great Recession, where aggregate
macro policies, because of the more fluid financial, credit and labor market matching mechanisms
appear to have worked better.
7 Conclusions
EU-area countries with large debt overhang seem to have entered a new period of disinflation, and
even deflation, following the period of output and employment decline during the great recession
2007-9. We demonstrate that such disinflation and deflation leads to a rising real interest rate,
exacerbating the leveraging problem, in particular during periods of low growth of real income.
There appeared to be a risk of a regime shift into high financial stress and rising credit spreads,
possibly accompanied by strong adverse macroeconomic feedback loops. To investigate the con-
sequences of overleveraging and the potential for destabilizing effects from deflation and financial
– and real–sector interactions we introduce first a theoretical model, and demonstrate, with the
presence of regime-dependent macro feedback relations, the possibility of an unstable dynamics
and downward spirals. In order to capture the heterogeneity in the Euro-area, we introduce decen-
tralized matching mechanisms on the labor and financial markets. We might then conjecture that
those dynamics are different for the Northern core countries in contrast to periphery countries.
If we admit debt overhang and disinflation and deflation, and endogenously generated credit
constraints, risk premia and credit spreads, we can observe destabilizing effects in the theoretical
and credit spread, see Furlanetto et al. (2014)).
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model, with persistent contractions and no debt sustainability. Moreover, with the rise of credit and
financial stress, large contractions, with protracted periods of large and persistent unemployment
spells, an unsustainable debt dynamics can arise. This is likely to be exacerbated when there
are significant adverse macro economic feedback effects of credit spreads and financial stress on
employment, consumption, investment demand, and utilization of capacity. On the other hand,
we showed that with increasing rates of inflation, low financial stress and low interest rates are
conducive to deleveraging, debt sustainability and higher growth of output and employment.
Overall, as we showed, in particular southern countries need higher inflation and growth rates to
overcome the debt deflation and financial stress risk drivers. Differences in the core and periphery
countries need to be taken into account in particular when employment and credit policies are
designed. Given the very heterogeneous matching mechanisms on the labor and credit markets,
more selective policies seem to be needed.
Empirically, deflationary trends in the Euro-Area were explored with MRVAR models with
regime dependent IRFs to study time series effects of risk drivers and investigated nonlinear rela-
tionships in higher dimensional regime change models where a measure of financial stress was the
regime defining variable. In general, MRVARs,64 help us understand what happens in different
regimes and one can observe state dependence of fiscal and monetary policy effects: one can pre-
dict a quite different impact of policies in contractions, in particular on output, employment and
inflation rates as well as financial stress, as compared to expansions.
Some regime dependence of macro laws are studied in appendix 5. As we demonstrate there,
using a low dimensional VSTAR method, the credit-output link, the Phillips-curve and Okun’s
Law are quite regime dependent and need to be looked at in a regime dependent context. As
to the credit-output link, negative output or credit shocks trigger much larger negative responses
to shocks in a high leveraging regime with excessive debt, as defined in appendix 4. This holds
for both when GDP or credit are shocked. Similar differences can be seen for the Phillips curve
and Okun’s law in a period of high financial stress as compared to a low stress regime. We also
show that significant differences of those macro laws can be uncovered for Southern as compared
to Northern EU-area countries.
Methodological, to explore the linkages between output, inflation, labor and financial markets,
we employ a new numerical solution method, called non-linear model predictive control (NMPC),
to solve our model variants. We have used this new numerical procedure in macro economics as it
helps to solve model variants with constraints and regime changes in finite horizon decision models.
NMPC allows one to solve those model variants by providing global solutions to higher dimensional
models studied and it is less constrained by the curse of dimension.
64For further results using MRVARs, see Mittnik and Semmler (2012a, 2012b, 2013), for results on VSTARs, see
Schleer and Semmler (2015), and Schleer et al. (2014).
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Appendix:
1. Numerical Procedure
For the numerical solution of the optimal control problem we do not apply here the dynamic
programming (DP) approach as in Ernst and Semmler (2010) or DYNARE as used to solve DSGE
model. Though DP method has the advantage that a global solution to the optimal control problem
can be found, by first computing an approximation to the optimal value V and then the optimal
control, and its time path, is computed from V . For a detailed description of the specifics of the
DP algorithm we are using we refer to Semmler and Gruene (2004). The main disadvantage of DP,
however, is that its numerical effort typically grows exponentially with the dimension of the state
variable. Hence, even for moderate state dimensions it may be impossible to compute a solution
with reasonable accuracy.65
A remedy to this problem can be obtained by using nonlinear model predictive control (NMPC).
Instead of computing the optimal value function for all possible initial states, NMPC only computes
single (approximate) optimal trajectories. In order to describe the method, let us abstractly write
the optimal decision problem as
maximize
ˆ 1
0
e ⇢t`(x(t), u(t))dt,
where x(t) satisfies x˙(t) = f(x(t), u(t)), x(0) = x0 and the maximization takes place over a set
of admissible control functions. By discretizing this problem in time, we obtain an approximate
discrete time problem of the form
maximize
1X
i=0
 i`(xi, ui), (20)
where the maximization is now performed over a sequence ui of control values and the sequence
xi satisfies xi+1 =  (h, xi, ui), Here h > 0 is the discretization time step,   = e ⇢h and  
is a numerical scheme approximating the solution of x˙(t) = f(x(t), u(t)) on the time interval
[ih, (i+1)h]. For details and references in which the error of this discretization is analyzed we refer
to Semmler and Gruene (2004).
The idea of NMPC now lies in replacing the maximization of the infinite horizon functional (1)
by the iterative maximization of finite horizon functionals
maximize
NX
k=0
 i`(xk,i, uk,i), (21)
for a truncated finite horizon N 2 N with xk+1,i =  (h, xk,i, uk,i) and the index i indicates the
number of the iteration, cf. the algorithm below. Note that neither   nor ` nor   changes when
passing from (1) to (2), only the optimization horizon is truncated.
Problems of type (2) can be efficiently solved numerically by converting them into a static
nonlinear program and solving them by efficient NLP solvers, see Gruene and Pannek (2011). In
our simulations, we have used a discounted variant of the MATLAB routine nmpc.m available from
www.nmpc-book.com, which uses MATLAB’s fmincon NLP solver in order to solve the resulting
static optimization problem.
Given an initial value x0, an approximate solution of (1) can now be obtained by iteratively
solving
(2) as follows:
65Another global algorithm that works with gridding and computation of the value function and computation of
the decision variables at each grid point, is used in Gavin et al. (2013), where a New Keynesian model is solved
globally. They point out quite different solutions far from the steady state as compared to solutions close to the
steady state. Thus, they also show that nonlinearities matter. Yet for their algorithm it also holds that there is a
curse of dimension.
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(1) for i=1,2,3,. . .
(2) solve (2) with initial value x0,i := xi and denote the
resulting optimal control sequence by u⇤k,i
(3) set ui := u⇤0,i and xi+1 :=  (h, xi, ui)
(4) end of for-loop
This algorithm yields an infinite trajectory xi, i = 1, 2, 3, . . . whose control sequence ui consists
of all the first elements u⇤0,i of the optimal control sequences for the finite horizon subproblems (2).
Under appropriate assumptions on the problem, it can be shown that the solution (xi, ui)
(which depends on the choice of N in (2) converges to the optimal solution of (1) as N !1. The
main requirement in these assumptions is the existence of an optimal equilibrium for the infinite
horizon problem (1). If this equilibrium is known, it can be used as an additional constraint in (2),
in order to improve the convergence properties.
However, recent results have shown that without a priory knowledge of this equilibrium this
convergence can also be ensured, see Gruene and Pannek (2011)), and this is the approach we
use in the computations in this paper. It should be noted that the references just cited treat
averaged instead of discounted infinite horizon problems. However, the main proofs carry over to
the discounted case, see Gruene et al. (2015). In any case, the solution generated by NMPC will
always provide a lower bound for the true optimal solution. The procedure also allows for irregular
impacts on the dynamics of the state variables and regime switches.66
2. The basic model – normal regime
The decentralized matching mechanisms on the labor market is as proposed in Merz (1995) and used
in Ernst and Semmler (2010)). For the matching mechanisms on the credit market we assume that
there is a stream of financial funds, Ft, determining the supply of available funds which come from
domestic savings and capital inflow. The demand for funds come from households for consumption
so that consumption can be smoothed inter-temporally and there is an intermediation for funds for
investment. Presuming that the households obtain funding without constraints, is an assumption
in order to reduce the dimension of the system, but we have still three state variables. All variables
are here in real terms.
Overall, the dynamic decision problem has three decision variables and it is subject to three
dynamic constraints, one for the change in employment, a second for capital accumulation, and a
third for debt accumulation:
max
Ct,It,Vt
ˆ N
0
U (Ct, Nt) e
 ⇢t =
ˆ N
0
(
C1 ⌘t
1  ⌘   eN
 
t
)
e ⇢t
s.t.
N˙t = m
L (st · Ut,Vt)   Nt (22)
K˙t = m
B (It,Bt)   Kt (23)
D˙t = rDt    [Y t   Ct   It     (st) (1 Nt)  ⇣ · Vt   '(gtKt)] (24)
The preferences are over consumption flows, C, and employment, N . The dynamics of eq. (22)
represents the evolution of employment which is normalized to one. Equation (23) denotes the
evolution of the capital stock and equation (24) represents the dynamics of aggregate debt (house-
holds and firms).67 Our debt dynamics is written here in a way which is standard if one allows
for borrowing of the private (or public sector), possibly also from abroad.68 There could be a
stochastic shock occurring along the path, for example represented by eq. (22) or eq. (23). Yet,
we will neglect such shocks, except when it will lead to a regime change in the dynamics.
66Note that in DSGE models regime switches are also perceived as something likely to occur which some literature
starts to explore now, see Farmer et al. (2009).
67We could also allow for sovereign debt here, though we do not specify what fraction of external debt is driven
by households, firms or the public sector.
68see Blanchard and Fisher (1989, ch.2) and Blanchard (1983).
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The terms represent Ct : aggregate consumption, Yt: aggregate production, A : (exogenous)
labor productivity, Ft: available financial funds through savings and external borrowing, Bt =
Ft   Ct: offered bonds to firms, Dt : the stock of external debt, r : the (exogenous given) interest
rate,69 Nt: employment and Vt: vacancies. In addition to costly search on the labor market, issuing
bonds adds another cost factor to the macroeconomic resource constraint, with per-period flow costs
of funds  (gtKt). Whereas Dt represents external debt, the term [.] is external borrowing (> 0) or
repayment (< 0), in the former case used for excess spending over domestic income, and moreover
Ft = µCt, µ > 1 . Thus, consumption can be smoothed inter-temporally, but investment funds
might be restricted. This means investment is more scrutinized through decentralized financial
market matching mechanisms,70 but if there is a consumption boom, more investment funds will
also be available.71
Moreover,   (s) is taken fixed, equal to s = 0.2. The function mL (st · Ut,Vt) in eq. (1) is a
a decentralized matching function on the labor market. Given the decentralized S&M outcome
by mL (st · Ut,Vt) the job finding rate of the unemployed will be mL(st·Ut,Vt)/Ut which will depend,
fixing the search intensity, on the vacancies posted by firms and the unemployment rate.72 The
job finding rate is thus the ratio of the numbers of new hires divided by the number of workers
searching for jobs. With higher unemployment and lower vacancies the job finding rate is lower.73
On the credit market there is also a decentralized matching mechanism defined by mB (It,Bt),
which represents the decentralized matching mechanisms, as S&M function, for the credit market.
Both, the S&M function for the labor and for the credit markets are Cobb-Douglas, with exponents
q0=0.5 and q1 = 0.5. The parameters  ,   are the separation rate and depreciation rate of capital,
and   is our regime switching parameter which will be either 1 or 0, depending on the degree of
leverage the economy reveals.
As mentioned, in order to modelling the supply of funds, we have made the external supply
of investment funds for firms a function of the supply of funds Ft   Ct. Given then the external
funding and the consumption decision, the remaining funding can be used for providing bond
offering to be matched with the bond demand arising from firms‘ desired investment It. Funding
for consumption will be available from domestic and external sources, but investment funding will
be obtained on the credit market by the decentralized matching process on the credit market. Note
that in this first step we do not have constraints on consumption smoothing.
Thus in this basic model here, we assume that consumption is a direct choice variable and
investment is expressed as intended investment, I, to be matched with the supply of bonds, the
supply of funds for bonds given by Ft  Ct. As mentioned, this might be a reasonable assumption
that allows us to work with a lower dimensional system. It also could be interpreted that the
screening and monitoring of investment funding takes place more extensively than funding for
optimal consumption. In the context here, consumption is only indirectly constrained, namely
through the generated output, its increase is given through the accumulation of capital stock
through investment.
We can solve for the basic model using our NMPC procedures. For the basic model, representing
a normal situation, where we have no regime switching, the two previous scenarios of sect. 4.1
and 4.2 do not necessarily prevail if strong monetary policy action are undertaken to reduce the
interest rate and the financial market stress. This could occur for example through a policy of
quantitative easing, which the US Fed has exercised and on which the ECB has embarked on since
the beginning of the year 2015.
For illustrating the potential effects of such a policy we presume that the actual interest rate
can be brought down to 3 percent and is kept there by the central banks monetary policy actions.
As parameters for the NMPC solution we assume again: µ = 1.3 and   = 035, ⇢ = r = 0.03,
69Note that the interest rate could be derived from a monetary policy rule, such as the Taylor rule, as for example
in Gavin et al. (2013). In the first step here we do not consider price dynamics.
70This in principle allows us to study more properly the heterogeneity of the EU-area credit market.
71This for example, was the situation in the period of great moderation in US until 2007, and in Spain, before
the financial meltdown of the years 2007-9. Of course, there are likely to be constraints for households’ borrowing
as well.
72This gives rise to the usual Beveridge curve
73For details, including also time varying labor market participation rates, see Christiano et al. (2014)).
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Figure 12: Dynamic solutions, horizontal axis is capital stock, vertical the debt to capital stock
ratio, for   = 1, global solution for two initial conditions, convergence to some steady state (where
the trajectories merge)
  = 0.03,   = 0.04, ↵ = 0.36, A = 1, ⇠ = 0.07,   = 5, e = 1. The parameter   is set to one.74
Applying the NMPC procedure, gives us a solution such as depicted in figure 12. In figure
12 the solution of eqs. (22)-(24) is shown which again represents an approximation of an infinite
horizon model by a finite horizon model, using a time horizon N = 6. As shown in figure 12 there
is a steady state at about K = 8.5⇤ and (D/K)⇤ = 2.25. The steady state is unique and all initial
conditions for the state variables would converge toward that point.
As shown in the figure, debt could be stabilized and a steady state debt to capital ratio could
be reached, see the upper converging point of the trajectories. We have chosen here parameter
values which give a large steady state leveraging. Yet, we hereby have assumed that we have a
regime of low interest rates which is supposed to be kept there at the low level.75 The yield on
debt is r = 0.03, equal to the discount rate, and the interest rate stays low even if leveraging
is increasing and becomes larger. This success could presumably be an outcome of strong and
persistent monetary policy actions.
3. GIRF algorithm
We follow the approach of Caggiano et al. (2014) in computing the GRIF. The algorithm has also
been outlined in Semmler and Haider (2015).
1. Take the set of all observations which allows us to build T   p + 1 histories to draw from
(with replacement). The histories are split into M regime-subsets (⌦1, . . . ,⌦M ) according to
the regime they belong to.
2. Take a set of histories (⌦i) out of one of the M subsets from step (1) and compute the
regime-dependent Variance-Covariance Matrix ⌃i.
3. Cholesky decompose ⌃i which gives ⌃i = CiC 0i and orthogonalize the regime-dependent
residuals to get the structural shocks: ei = C 1i ✏i
4. Draw a history !j 2 ⌦i.
74The parameter   can be used as switching parameter, and   = 0 would indicate the binding of credit constraints.
This case is further explored in a companion paper, we will stay here with   = 1.
75The interest rate could be close to the zero bound, which would make the debt sustainability and convergence
even more likely.
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5. From ei draw a set of n four-dimensional structural errors e⇤i = (eit, . . . , eit+n) with replace-
ment, where the contemporaneous correlation of the structural errors is taken into account.
Afterwards transform the residuals back into their reduced form representation: ✏⇤i = Cie⇤i .
6. Use the history from step (4) and the structural errors from step (5) to simulate the model
with the parameters from the MRVAR model.
7. Take the structural errors from step (5) and add an additional shock in period t : evi =
(eit + vt, . . . , eit+n). Then compute the reduced form errors as in (5).
8. Use the history from step (4) and the structural errors from step (7) to simulate the model.
9. Repeat steps (5) through (8) R = 100 times and take the average of the simulations from
step (6) and from step (8). The difference of the averages represents the GIRF for history j.
10. Repeat steps (2) through (9) l = 300 times for regime i where the histories are drawn from
⌦i with replacement. Take the average over all estimated GIRF i (GIRF i,1, . . . , GIRF i,l)
which represents the GIRF for regime i.
11. Repeat steps (2) through (10) for all regimes to get the GIRF for all M regimes.
12. The confidence intervals are computed by taking the 5% and 95% percentile of the densities
of the simulated GIRF (GIRF 1, . . . , GIRF l) for each regime.
4. Measuring excess leveraging
Since one issue of the debt deflation is the build-up of excess debt, we here briefly want to sketch
how this can be measured. Excess debt is defined as difference of actual debt and sustainable
debt.76
Sustainable Debt
Stein (2012) shows how the optimal debt ratio can be derived in the simplified case of logarithmic
utility. The stochastic differential equation for net worth is (A1).
dX(t) = X(t)[(1 + f(t))(dP (t)/P (t) +  (t)dt)  i(t)f(t)  cdt] (A1)
X(t) =Net worth, f(t) = debt/net worth = L(t)/X(t), dP (t)/P (t) = capital gain or loss, as
stochastic, i(t) = interest rate, also stochastic, (1 + f(t)) = assets/net worth,  (t) = productivity
of capital. Hereby c(t) = C(t)/X(t), consumption/net worth, c is taken as fixed. Let the price
evolve stochastically as
dP (t) = P (t)(a(t)dt+  pdwp) (A2)
where drift a(t) will depend upon the Model I or II. The interest rate also evolves as stochastic
process
i(t) = idt+  idwi (A3)
substitute (A2) and (A3) in (A1) and derive (A4)
dX(t) = X(t)[(1 + f(t))(a(t)dt+  (t)dt)  (if(t)dt+ c dt)] + [(1 + f(t)) pdwp  if(t)dwi]
dX(t) = X(t)M((t)dt+X(t)B(f(t)) (A4)
M(f(t)) = [(1 + f(t)(a(t)dt+  (t))dt  (if(t) + c)]
76For details, see Schleer et al. (2014).
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B(t) = [(1 + f(t)) pdwp    if(t)dwi]
B2((t) = (1 + f(t)2 2pdt+ f(t)
2 2i dt  2f(t)(1 + f(t)) i pdwpdwi
Risk = R(f(t)) = (
1
2
)[(1 + f(t))2 2b + f(t)
2 2i   2(t)(1 + f(t)) b i⇢)]
M(f(t)) contains the deterministic terms and B(f(t)) contains the stochastic terms. To solve
for X(t) consider the change in lnX(t) (A5). This is based upon the Ito equation of the stochas-
tic calculus. As Stein shows using the logarithmic criterion one does not need to use dynamic
programming. The expectation of d lnX(t) is (A6).
dlnX(t) = (1/X(t))dX(t)  (1/2X(t)2)(dX(t))2 (A5)
E[d(lnX(t))] = [M((t)] R[((t)]dt] (A6)
Equ. (A6) represents a mean-variance formulation. The correlation ⇢ dt = E(dwpdwi) is
negative, which increase risk. (dt)2 = 0, dwdt = 0.
The optimal debt ratio f⇤ maximizes the difference between the Mean and Risk.
f⇤ = argmax[M(f(t)) R(f(t))] = [a(t) +  (t)  i]  [( 2p   ⇢ i b)]/ 2 (A7)
 2 =  2i +  
2
p   2⇢ i p
On model version of Stein (2012) assumes mean reversion so that the price P (t) has a trend
rt and a deviation y(t) from it (A8). The deviation y(t) follows an Ornstein-Uhlenbeck ergodic
mean reverting process (A9). Coefficient ↵ is positive and finite. The interest rate is the same as
in model II.
P (t) = P (0)exp[rt+ y(t)] (A8)
dy(t) =  ↵y(t) +  pdwp (A9)
Therefore using the stochastic calculus a(t) in Model I is the first term in (A10)
dP (t)/P (t) = (r   ↵y(t) + (1
2
 2p)dt+  pdwp (A10)
Substitute (A10) in (A7) and derive (A11), the optimal debt ratio in Model I.
f⇤(t) = [(r   i) +     ↵y(t)  (1
2
) 2p + ⇢ i p]/ 
2 (A11)
Hereby Stein considers  (t) as deterministic.
Another Model on capital gains and returns presumes the price equation is (A12). The drift is
a(t)dt = ⇡ dt with a diffusion term  pdwp.
dP (t)/P (t) = ⇡dt+  pdwp (A12)
The optimal debt ratio f⇤(t) is (A13). Again, consider  (t) as deterministic.
f⇤(t) = [(⇡ +  (t)  i)  ( 2p   ⇢ i p)]/ 2 (A13)
 2 =  2i +  
2
p   2⇢ i p
Empirical measures of excess leveraging of banks can be obtained as discussed in Schleer et al.
(2014). There it is shown what empirical variables are needed to compute sustainable debt and
actual debt, both as normalized debt ratios.
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((r   i) +      ˜ + 0.5 2r + ⇢ ⇤  i ⇤  r)/ 2 (25)
with r=capital gains , i= long-term government bond yield,  = productivity of capital,  ˜ =
demeaned beta (beta deviation),  2r = Half of the square of the demeaned capital gain, i¯= demeaned
interest rate, r¯= demeaned capital gain, ⇢= correlation of i and r,  i= standard deviation of interest
rate,  r= standard deviation of capital gain,  = risk element =( i +  r   2(⇢¯ir¯)).
Capital gains, denoted by the variable r, are calculated as the percentage change in the stock
market capitalization (market cap) of the bank during the period. The market cap data is given
quarterly and computed as the product of the stock market price and the common shares outstand-
ing. The common shares outstanding is the difference between issued shares and treasury shares.
The market cap is subject to stock market swings. To eliminate these, and to obtain the trend
of capital gains, the Hodrick-Prescott-Filter with parameter   = 1600 matched to the quarterly
frequency of the data is applied. The filtered capital gain is then given by the percentage change
between the year-end market caps.
The long-term government bond yield i corresponds to the long-term (9/10-year) treasury yield
of the country the bank is mainly situated at and is given in percent. The productivity of capital
  is calculated by dividing the bank’s net income from the annual shareholders’ equity for each
period. More precisely, we consider the net income after preferred dividends which the bank uses
to calculate its basic earnings per share. The annual shareholders’ equity is thereby given as the
sum of preferred stock and common shareholders equity. Once again year-end data is used. To
calculate the beta deviation  ˜, the difference between each period’s beta from the mean beta over
all periods is computed. The demeaned interest rate i¯ and demeaned capital gain r¯ are calculated
identically.
The correlation ⇢ of the capital gains r and the interest rate i is calculated over the entire
period and then used as a constant value over the periods. Similarly, the standard deviations  i
and  r of the interest rate and capital gain, are also constant over the periods. The risk element  
of the formula is given as the sum of the standard deviations  i and  r deducting twice the value
of the variances of the interest rate, capital gain and the correlation between them.
The actual debt ratio is calculated as the average yearly long term debt balances divided by
the average yearly total assets. When both the actual and sustainable are normalized, one can
take the difference of the two to obtain excess leveraging, which plays an important role in our
estimation of the vulnerability of the economic sectors considered.
5. Regime dependent macro laws
Using two or three dimensional VARs and IRs we can estimate a small-scale macro-econometric
models with multiple regimes, using vector smooth-transition auto-regressive techniques (VSTAR)
and applying it to data for the US and EU country groups. But note, though the smooth transition
auto-regression method (STAR) model, is able to estimate regimes and to capture different dynamic
properties over time and across regimes, so far only low dimensional macro problems have been
addressed. In general, regimes can be estimated through an indicator function, a Markov switching
model or a STAR model (a smooth transition regression model). A specific regime can be defined
by an output regime (low and high output growth rates),77 financial market regime (low and high
financial market stress),78 or with respect to low and high leveraging (see Schleer et al. (2014)).
We here refer to a VSTAR model, as originating in Teraesvirta and Yang (2014) and used in
Schleer and Semmler (2015)). There are usually only two variables, where one variable is (an)
endogenous transition variable. Thus the regime change variable can be an endogenous variable,
but if it is an exogenous variable, one can employ three variables. In the estimations below, we
model a special case where one transition function governs the whole VSTAR system, with an
endogenous or exogenous transition variable. The transition function captures the non-linearity
77Mittnik and Semmler (2012b)
78Mittnik and Semmler (2013) and Schleer and Semmler (2015)
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of the transition variable with respect to the other variables of the system and, hence, looks as
follows:
g(fst| , c) = [1 + exp(  (fst   c))] 1,   > 0 (26)
which is bounded between zero and one, is monotonically increasing in fst, depends on the transi-
tion speed ( ), the location parameter (c) and the transition variable (fst). The transition variable
is either a contemporaneous or lagged variable, and can be an endogenous or exogenous variable.
The parameter   as well as c are estimated. The location parameter c defines the threshold. We
usually evaluate two regimes, m = 2, with :
TV t d < c (regime below c)
TV t d   c (regime above c)
As time series data for financial stress one can use the IMF FSI or the ZEW FCI. The latter
has extensively included banking variables. The time series for the IMF FSI we are using below
covers the period 1980 to 2012. The ZEW Financial Condition Indix (FCI) for the Euro- area
reflects better financial sector conditions and stress. More than the FSI, the FCI focuses on the
banking sector. This newly compiled data set relies on 21 financial sector series for each country.
This index also tracks market volumes, particularly within the banking sector, as well as prices.
For instance, the FCI includes the annual growth rate of assets over liabilities, which represents
available bank collateral; the ratio of short- over long-term debt securities issued by banks; and
the annual growth rate of bank lending to the private sector as well as a divers set of interest rates.
Such an inclusion of banking-related factors with a strong link to the economic downturn improves
the accuracy of our indices. Most of the variables are available at the country level, some are
Euro-area aggregates. To account for a fairly high correlation across some variables, the ZEW FCI
is established using a dynamic factor model to extract the common factor (for each country).79
Next, let us explore some non-linear macro relationships
5.1 Regime dependent credit - output link
As figure 13 demonstrates, for the euro area as a whole, the impulse-responses to both negative
GDP and negative credit shocks differ significantly between the two regimes. As regime defining
variable we have used the time series data on excess leveraging provided by Schleer et al. (2014)
of the EU banking system, see appendix 4 for the measures. We define two regimes, one regime
with no excess debt and another with excess debt (overleveraging) of the EU Countries’ banking
system. Then we study the impact of GDP shocks on credit flows in those two regimes, using
regime dependent VARS and IRs.
As can in general be seen in figure 15, negative output or credit shocks trigger much larger
effects in the high leveraging regime with excessive debt, both for GDP and for credit adjustments.
Similarly, credit adjusts downwards much faster in response to a negative GDP shock when the
Euro area is in conditions of high leveraging regime.
Similar results, not reported here, are obtained when looking specifically at peripheral (South-
ern) Euro-area countries. Here again, adjustments to GDP and credit are much stronger in a high-
financial stress regime than under normal borrowing conditions, leading to significant responses of
both GDP and credit to a negative credit shock.
5.2. Regime dependent Phillips Curve
We carry out the same exercise for the Phillips curve, for the Euro-area, also distinguishing be-
tween core and periphery countries. Again, the Euro-area periphery group aggregates information
for Greece, Italy, Portugal, Spain and Ireland whereas the Euro-area core group sums up unem-
ployment and inflation data for Austria, France and Germany.80
79For a detailed description of sources and transformations of the data and variables, see Schleer and Semmler
(2015).
80Note that for the subsequent exercise we take the ZEW FCI, since the IMF FSI does not cover sufficiently the
EU countries of interest.
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GDP on GDP Credit on GDP
GDP on credit Credit on credit
Note: The blue line represents normal financial conditions, the red line excessive debt.
Figure 13: Impulse-response functions in different financial regimes: Euro area
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Figure 14 compares the reaction of both the unemployment and the inflation rate with respect
to a positive unemployment rate shock for the two regimes of financial stress. For the two different
regimes Panel A depicts results for the Euro-area periphery country group whereas Panel B presents
the results for the Euro-area core country group. The blue lines depict the reaction of the economy
in periods of low financial stress, the green the reaction when financial stress is high.
As can be seen from the different charts, the reaction of unemployment to a adverse shock on
the labor market is very similar in both regimes with unemployment increasing over the five years
following the shock. Small differences exist between the two regimes in the Euro-area core country
group where, notably, the unemployment rate rises further when financial stress is low. More
significant are, however, the differences in inflation dynamics between the two regimes. In both
country groups, inflation declines much more strongly in periods of high financial stress. Note that
the disinflationary pressure is even stronger in the high financial stress regime among Euro-area
core countries, highlighting one of the challenges to Euro-area periphery countries have been facing
during the crisis: Despite record-high unemployment rates, inflation rates fell only very gradually
such as to restore competitiveness in these countries. Our estimates reflect this strong persistence
of inflation dynamics in these countries, as discussed in sects. 2 and 3.
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Figure 14: Regime-dependent Phillips curve, ZEW-FCI as exogenous transition variable: Euro-area
core vs. periphery
5.3 Regime-dependent Okun’s law
Finally, we want to present results that also confirm some nonlinearities with respect to output
growth and unemployment reduction. This relationship has been called Okun’s law, that output
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growth drives employment and thus reduces unemployment. We want to explore here, again
using our VSTAR method, with the ZEW FCI as transition variable, whether the unemployment
reduction is also regime dependent, whereby the regime is again defined by high or low financial
stress.
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Figure 15: Regime-dependent Okun’s law, ZEW-FCI as exogenous transition variable: Euro area
core vs. periphery
Overall, as can be seen from the two left graphs of Panel A and B of figure 15, a positive shock
on output reduces the unemployment more in the periphery countries than in the core countries
(see the scale), but if there is financial stress in the periphery countries, the growth has a larger
success on reduction of unemployment if the growth rate is increased. Moreover, the second round
effect of growth on growth is stronger in the South than in the North. This means that a higher
growth rates in the Southern countries are useful targets to bring up employment in the South.
6. Data
We are estimating a 4 dimensional MRVAR for France and Germany with change in the index of
industrial production, change in inflation rate, interest rate, and the ZEW FCI index (see Schleer
et al. (2014)) as the endogenous threshold variable. The index of industrial production and the
inflation rate are taken from Eurostat. The interest rate was obtained from the MFI interest rate
statistics by the ECB81. The dataset for France and Germany runs from 2003 until 2013 on a
monthly basis.
81https://sdw.ecb.europa.eu/browse.do?node=2018774
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A 4 dimensional MRVAR is estimated for Spain and Italy as well. Here we use the change in
GDP, inflation rate, interest rate, and the ZEW FCI index as endogenous threshold variable as
well. However, the sources differ: for change in GDP and inflation we use the data provided by the
GVAR project (Smith and Galesi (2014)), while the GVAR data, together with the MFI interest
rate statistics of the ECB82, were used for computing the interest rate. The data runs from 1980
until 2013 on a quarterly basis.
Smith and Galesi (2014) obtain their data from the International Financial Statistics (IFS)
provided by the IMF. GDP is a real index with base year 2005 (concept: Gross Domestic Product,
Real Index, Quarterly, 2005 = 100), while the inflation rate represents changes in consumer prices
(concept: Consumer Prices, All items, Quarterly, 2005 = 100).
For Spain and Italy we also utilize the long-term interest rate of the GVAR project (concept:
Interest Rates, Government Securities, Government Bonds concept) and augment it with long-term
borrowing from the MFI interest rate statistics. The interest rate was computed the following way:
from 1980 until 2003 we use the GVAR data which has been detrended by a linear trend. From
2003 until 2013 the GVAR interest rate is substituted for the MFI interest rate.
82https://sdw.ecb.europa.eu/browse.do?node=2018774
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